Fifteen years is a short period as theological eras go, but in the rapidly changing theological viewpoints of those outside the Church it is perhaps long. There was a large output of writing then, much of it an attempt to clear issues or to find some anchor-hold after the somewhat severe Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy among American non-Catholics. A look into some of the literature concerned with God and Religion (to cover it exhaustively would be too long) and a presentation of some of the later currents of thought are here attempted.
evolution was making religion, in origin, a thing of the sensual nature, the outcome of fears or other emotions. It was the day when the theories of the 19th century concerning the origin of religion had not been discarded, though they were beginning to be thoroughly refuted by anthropologists. At the end of his analysis, Father Bruehl spoke of the then new German Phenomenalism.
The article of Father Bruehl took account of adverse currents. Among non-Catholics it did not mention the still strong orthodox forces. How strong the liberalizing movement was at the time (1925) is fortunately answered for us in a survey which was published in the Methodist Quarterly Review (July, 1925) . The poll was an attempt to find the reaction of Protestant Theological seminaries to the recent Fundamentalist controversy. The survey revealed that 33 seminaries were definitely orthodox, 40 seminaries were definitely liberal, 11 seminaries occupied a middle ground, and 7 seminaries were non-committal.
A survey made in 1929 by t\ie Literary Digest (May 4, 1929) by Professor G. H. Betts enables one to see the situation from another angle. To a questionnaire sent to 1500 ministers and seminarians, some 700 replied, 500 of these ministers. Some interesting points in the tables occur. None denies God's existence, but on every other point there is noticeable a lesser doctrinal faith in the seminarians than in the older generation. Thus, while only 9% of the ministers deny God is omnipotent, 29% of the students do. 66% of the ministers believe that the New Testament is God's final revelation of God to man; only 18% of the seminarians do. 13% of the ministers deny the Trinity; among the students the denial is found in 35 %.
Professor Betts conducted another survey in the Christian Century (May 9, 1934) concerning the religious ideas which ought to be disseminated in Protestant religious instruction. Among other questions, this is pertinent: should man's descent from an inferior form be taught to children? 46 % of the ministers answered affirmatively; out of the eight seminaries which were polled, the author concluded that 66% of the seminarians thought evolution should be taught to the young. It would seem to follow that the obstacle which Father Bruehl found to right thinking about religion in 1925 will be a larger stumbling-block as the years go on. The students who voted in the surveys are, many of them, presumably now in the Protestant ministry.
Such views almost naturally resulted in posing the question, "What must be done about religion?" Charles A. Bennett may be cited as a contender for a quietistic attitude. To the author of "Worship in its Philosophical Meaning" [Journ. of Religion, 6 (1926) 486], worship is a period of pause in the current of living, marked by an absence of effort. "We are to make ourselves receptive so that our wills may be commanded from without; but it is not only an apprehension of such external power, for power may produce fear, and in worship, if there is fear, it must be holy fear. The contemplation proper to worship differs from the esthetic variety, for it renews moral energies, stirs consciousness to one's defects, stimulates reform, answers doubts we have of the value of faith, gives singleness of aim and dispels despair, and substitutes creative inspiration for heroic resolve.
Voices were heard in favor of effort too. Professor James Ward in his article " Faith and Eternal Life" [Hibbert Journ., 23 (1924-25) 193] , held faith to be conative, and eventually volitional. He contended that it was already clear from the history of religious experience and from psychological research that it is a fatal error to call faith intellectual. Faith is trustfulness, involving a transvaluation of man's values through resolve. Thus, instead of following graven idols or dogmatic creeds, one is filled with an assurance of the unseen and atemporal and of the presence of a divine personality. The dogmatico-intellectual, liturgico-formalistic and ecclesiastico-political evolution of Christianity almost killed this proper sort of faith. We must return to the primitive enthusiasm of Christian striving (the conative element) and of Christian resolving (the volitional element) which is exemplified in the Ufe of Christ. There we find the beauty and winsomeness of a faith which true followers will strive to attain.
This was not the single article to presuppose the exclusion of the intellect from the field of religion. Professor John Baillie, in an article on the "Idea of Orthodoxy" [Hibbert Journ. 24 (1925-26) 232] put the question: when did the idea of obligatory intellectual assent to doctrine become the test of orthodoxy. It is not found in Jesus, for his demand of faith is for the faith which in the Fourth Gospel is summed up in the concept of reliance. Nor is intellectualism found in the early Pauline writings. It shows first in the Pastorals, and after that, increasingly in the Church of the creeds. This change of an essential element of Christianity is traced to the influence of Socrates and Plato, especially to the doctrine in Plato's Laws, where "right opinion" (orthodoxy) commands a belief in the existence of the gods, in their providence, and in their purity of any stain of bribery. Modern toleration, however, makes it clear that there is no penalty for unbelief; moral goodness has again become our duty, not belief. There will be and there need be belief and orthodoxy only insofar as a code of goodness involves certain intellectual positions. With Kant, the author says that "there are beliefs inextricably woven with my moral nature." Baillie therefore substitutes for the formula, "I believe in God through Jesus Christ," the formula, "I put my trust in the love of God made manifest through Jesus Christ our Lord."
Edward Scribner Ames, in his article, "The Religion of Immanuel Kant" [Journ. of Religion, 5 (1925) Church), though he gave greater place in his theology to a sense of sin, a yearning for salvation, and an assurance of it. Together on a French Protestant Theological Faculty, they worked out their Symbolo-Fideism, of which Professor Horton notes the following points. The authors hold that the opposition of faith and science is less than commonly asserted, for religion is something far deeper than science. The formulations of doctrine might seem to clash with science, but this is because such formulations are only symbols; they are inadequate expressions of the deep, of the unutterable. Religion has great underlying truths, which are grasped by the religious and moral consciousness; creeds and doctrines are but fumbling external pronouncements of inexpressible inner convictions. Creeds, therefore, are always insufficient, and will always pass away and change; faith will remain, since it is the eternal witness of an order of truth which transcends scientific truth. Faith and Symbol together make up our religious total; what science attacks is only the Symbol, not Faith.
It might seem that with Symbolo-Fideism one has nothing to defend, since quick desertion of doctrinal expression would seem to be invited on the mere approach of a scientist; yet also, one might conclude that doctrinal expression is to be improved as much as possible. This seems to be the view of Georg Wobbermin, as his system is described in a review of his book, "Wesen und Wahrheit des Christentums" [Journ. of Religion, 6 (1926) 211], The reviewer is Gerald Burney Smith, who thus summarizes Wobbermin's views. To arrive at the essence and truth of Christianity we must abandon the road of the history of origins and doctrines. This leads to a barren Historismus. The psychological approach is the surer way, for the basic reality of religious life is experience (Erfahrung) ; through inner forces this becomes conviction (Überzeugung), and finally passes into doctrinal expression.
Let religious experience, if it will, play in and out of objective history, and thus it may increase and precisize its convictions, and thus mold and remold doctrinal forms. Doctrine must always seek as its norm the basal religious experience; thus trinitarianomonotheism is but an expression of a fundamental experience of God at once as Father, Redeemer and Paraclete. In Wobbermin, experience is also a norm of history; an inner postulate of revelation restores to some extent the discredited Scriptures. Thus the divine power of Jesus to save is essential; not so a secondary expression of this, the Virgin Birth. So too, a Trinity is to be retained, but the Nicene formulation of the doctrine is unsuited to modern thinking. Again, Jesus must have entered into glory, but the doctrine of the resurrection is an expression of this which cannot stand modern search. All, however, is not relative; the absoluteness of a Christian revelation is affirmed on the ground that religious experience requires confidence in the finality of the redemption realized through Christian faith. Moreover, nothing more absolute than the Christian conception of the trinitariano-monotheistic redeeming God can be conceived; therefore, it is absolute. Professor Smith concludes the review with the assertion, "Wobbermin is right in his recognition of the fact that the ultimate reality of Christianity must be found in the religious experience of Christians."
Shailer Matthews in his "The Faith of Modernism" defines the modernism of 1925, and it has not changed substantially since. The faith of Modernism is not a mere matter of emotions or of social values, but it is based on the conviction that Jesus is a revelation of God. The modernist is convinced that his attitudes are consistent with other realities; he expresses his convictions in accordance with patterns which are drawn from current social ideas and life of men. The test of Christianity is active loyalty to Christ and his message that God is fatherly and that men, therefore, can and ought to be brotherly.
With this Christianity doctrinal formulas are not to be identified; this was the error of confessionalism; dogmatic expression is only functional. It seems that the relation of this view of Modernism on doctrine with the Symbolo-Fideism of Ménégoz is not far to seek. Professor Nichols, the writer of this account, points out that the Fundamentalist view is one that approaches Catholicism in that it leans to the side which declares that there is a competent tribunal to declare what the Word of God means. He also points out that underlying the conservative view is the doctrine that religion is founded on some abnormal religious experience. By this he means that it accepts revelation, the inspiration of the Bible, and doctrines which cannot be comprehended by pure reason.
It was to be expected that many of the attempts to define the nature of religion would finally make necessary the query whether or not God Himself was necessary to the very essence of a religion. Many of the replies were so worded as not to include even the Lord of Man, certainly a strange enough phenomenon. In 1925 Gerald Birney Smith put the question openly in "Is Theism Essential to Religion?" [Journ. of Religion, 5 (1925) 356]. The writer discusses Robert Flint's defense of Theism, and its definition to the effect that Theism implies that nature has a Creator and Preserver, the nations a Governor, and man a heavenly Father and Judge. Professor Smith points out that God as Governor of nations was outmoded through political theory, that God as Lord of nature was set aside through scientific advance concerning physical causes and social sins; hence, finally it is to be asked if the God of Theism who deals with man is to be retained. History shows that doctrines about gods and God have sprung up and passed; religion is said to have a way of outgrowing its theologies. The author's view is that we must engage upon empirical study of that which we adore, and then in terms of that experience formulate our conception of God rather than in the terms of any a priori philosophy assumed to be final. "Men may believe in God without being able to define God."
Catholic theologians, conscious of the rigorous logic in the arguments for the existence of God, may be astounded at the flight from reason which is exhibited, and question whether or not a calm consideration of the proofs has taken place. It is to be emphasized that in this matter the influence of Kant has been almost mesmeric. It is difficult to know how many have really read and studied the superficial page on which he states that the cosmological argument is only another form of the ontological; nevertheless one is not impressed with the fact that the arguments are any more thoroughly pondered now than in Kant's day. The essay of Durant Drake, "Critical Realism and Theism" [Journ. of Religion, 5 (1925) 130] reviews, superficially as I think, the arguments, and rejects them somewhat halfheartedly. "Thus, without meaning in the least to imply that these rejections are final, we cannot help realizing that the stock theistic arguments are highly precarious." And later, "It is obvious that the existence of the supernatural God does not stand on a par, evidentially, with the existence of . . . physical facts."
Mind apparently has been given up as means of attaining to a knowledge of God. It remains to find the direct assertion that God is known only in the subrational. Here the rationalistic view, which rejects all supernaturalism, harmonizes strangely with the statements of the revitalized supernaturalism of the Reform. In Karl Barth's preface to his dogmatic treatise on God there is the assertion that the doctrine of "analogia entis" is the discovery of the devil; both in his exegetical and dogmatical works he denies true knowledge of the "entirely other"; yet, in the deeps of his being, man is put in contact with God. Knowledge of God through the feelings, emotions, and senses, in a word, through some form of lower experience, is definitely proposed, apparently without being aware of the strangeness of admitting that man's lesser and inferior features touch God, while that which makes him man, his reason, is incapable of reaching the sublime.
Henry Nelson Wieman definitely defends a knowledge of God in the field beyond thought in "How Do We Know God?" [Journ. of Religion, 5 (1925) 113]. His first postulate is that our experience covers a wider field than our cognition; it includes a vast number of stimuli which are not well organized in our consciousness, and our thoughts fail to crystallize out many of these experiences. The author assumes the position that we cannot know God through cognition; hence the question is pertinent: can we know Him in our non-cognitional experience. The dilemma is set before the reader: Either God is the object of sensuous experience, or else he is purely a system of concepts and nothing else. From this Professor Wieman concludes that God is to be found in that realm where experience ranges more widely than thought. There, apparently, God is abundantly known. For we may experience and not know it (as we breathe oxygen) ; we may experience and not know the intimate nature of the experience; we may experience and know the phenomenal form and not the underlying sub-stance; we may experience and know that substance. In all four ways men experience God. This is clear from the record of religious experience.
Certainly it would require a very blind optimist to judge that the situation of fifteen years ago has become in any substantial way better. The doctrinal surveys, which were mentioned above, indicate that supernatural religion was losing, not gaining ground. And since religion is inconceivable without God, and since a vague non-cognitional God can never do for rational beings, it seems that the first duty of those who have systematic truth would be to hammer upon and publicize the proofs of God's existence. And there does not seem to be any doubt about the fact that a very elementary and plain exposition is needed, along with a clear critique of Kant's strictures, if the minds of America are to be recaptured from the fortress of sense and experience in which they are immured. In our attempt to draw men's minds back again to God, a God, be it noted, whom they seek earnestly, even if the liberal writers find Him only through sense, we must understand their positions and invite them to a consideration of a sympathetic apologetic. What was held in non-Catholic America in 1925, was held also in the intervening years, and is held today.
For the years between I may abstain from prolix notation of articles, and refer singly to a book, "Is There a God?" The contents of this book must have been widely read, for it is a "Conversation," which was planned by the Christian Century, and ran some six months in its pages Of the three, Professor Macintosh seems to be the most vigorous Theist. He disagrees with Professor Wieman on certain points, but agrees with him in not taking very much stock in rationalistic projects for proving the existence of God (294). That God the object of religious dependence and the source of religious deliverance is, is sufficiently known! Hence one must seek rather what God is.
The views of Professor Wieman have found place previously. In his conclusory article of the "Conversation," he notes that the important thing is not to believe that God exists, but to submit oneself to that process which is God (327). This "process" is defined (317) as the one which promotes the highest goods of life; it is a process of interaction which develops individuality and makes individuals contribute to the social good through associated living; it is God working in man, though God is not limited to the human level.
Professor Otto, finding that it is harmful to rely on God, affirms the non-existence of God; he is a spokesman of atheistic humanism.
The The only norm of judging is the spirit of God as revealed in Jesus. Judged by such a canon, Esther, Samson, the imprecatory Psalms, and the war stories must go; in short, those parts without spiritual meaning are without authority. Christians will not agree on the divine parts, though they ought to agree on the general norm. However, the parts having good moral standards, the spiritual experiences of the prophets, the two ways (of God to man and man to God) are valuable. Yet, in principle, only that is authoritative for the Christian by which he is made aware and by which he feels a compulsion that God is addressing him; that leads him to assent, obey and adore.
A small place for authoritative guidance through tradition (in the liberal sense) is found in the article, "Authority and the Normative Approach" by Henry N. Wieman [Journ. of Religion, 16 (1936) 175]. The author here proposes the normative approach which is a compromise or an accumulation as one views it from different angles. History shows that the norms for testing the acceptable in religious belief have been six, (i) inherited tradition, due to disappear as society became more complex; (ii) a selective agency, as in Christianity where an authoritative norm was exercised through the Pope, or Bible, or church; (iii) inner experience which necessarily led to division and is psychologically untrustworthy; (iv) the scientific method, sought as a means of escape from threatened disintegration; it observes and properly evaluates life; (v) the cosmic-social process; (vi) the Unconditioned, the "absolutely other." The last norm is declared the best; it exercises authority by delivering us from the domination of any specified objective, or other specific reality, ... by liberating us from bondage to anything which can come within the scope of definable human concerns. By this the author seems to me to mean that singly and solely God and man are in contact, though man is not knowably, though experientially, aware of it. The writer avers that the Unconditional does not tell us anything, but even if so, the normative approach takes advantage of anything good in any of the six norms.
The modernists among the liberal theologians have sought a norm in the ethical teachings of Christ as described in the Eschatological School. The tenets of the school are well known, especially through five writers, J. Weiss {Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes? 1900), Wrede (Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien, 1901), Volz (Eschatologie der jüdischen Gemeinde im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter, 1903, 2nd, 1934), and Loisy (Evangiles synoptiques, 1907). More influential in popularizing the practical consequences of the school was A. Schweitzer (Messianitäts-und Leidensgeheimnis, and, Von Reimarus zu Wrede, 1907). In the Eschatological School it is a logical corollary to regard the whole ethical doctrine of Christ as a practical platform for the short period on earth before the expected coming. The "Interimsethik" may be much or little depending on the particular view which the higher critic brings to a study of the Gospels; it has tended to diminish in the views of the Formgeschichtliche School and also in that of the Social-Historical School. But whatever it is, there arises the question of its value for our times.
Both in Europe and America, the value of the Interimsethik has been proclaimed. A lengthy development of the thesis may be found in F. Buri, "Die Bedeutung der Neutestamentlichen Eschatologie für die neuere Protestantische Theologie" (Zurich, 1935). The Ritschlian Value-Judgment can seize upon something precious in the eschatological teachings; for it may seize the very essence, which is the will to perfection. This will was expressed in fanciful apocalyptic in the times of Jesus; but the expression is quite incidental, a point in which the writer agrees with the SymboloFideist view. The same basic awe of the mystery of the world, life and being is to be emphasized as well as the constant activity of God in the processes of life. In a word, the insistence on perfection, attempted in the Gospels through an apocalyptic threat of a near coming, is to be revamped to suit modern needs. 
